Softmax-based Classification is k-means Clustering: Formal Proof,
  Consequences for Adversarial Attacks, and Improvement through Centroid Based
  Tailoring by Hess, Sibylle et al.
Softmax-based Classification is k-means Clustering: Formal Proof, Consequences
for Adversarial Attacks, and Improvement through Centroid Based Tailoring
Sibylle Hess
Wouter Duivesteijn
Decebal Mocanu
Abstract
We formally prove the connection between k-means clustering
and the predictions of neural networks based on the softmax
activation layer. In existing work, this connection has been ana-
lyzed empirically, but it has never before been mathematically
derived. The softmax function partitions the transformed input
space into cones, each of which encompasses a class. This is
equivalent to putting a number of centroids in this transformed
space at equal distance from the origin, and k-means cluster-
ing the data points by proximity to these centroids. Softmax
only cares in which cone a data point falls, and not how far
from the centroid it is within that cone. We formally prove that
networks with a small Lipschitz modulus (which corresponds
to a low susceptibility to adversarial attacks) map data points
closer to the cluster centroids, which results in a mapping to a
k-means-friendly space. To leverage this knowledge, we pro-
pose Centroid Based Tailoring as an alternative to the softmax
function in the last layer of a neural network. The resulting
Gauss network has similar predictive accuracy as traditional
networks, but is less susceptible to one-pixel attacks; while
the main contribution of this paper is theoretical in nature, the
Gauss network contributes empirical auxiliary benefits.
1 Introduction
The likely cause for the resurgence of neural networks in the
deep learning era lies in what people term their “unreason-
able effectiveness” (Sun et al. 2017; Fabbri and Moro 2018;
Zhang et al. 2018; Flagel, Brandvain, and Schrider 2018):
they work well, so we use them. This is an understand-
able reflex. In the enthusiasm with which the scientific
community has embraced deep learning, building an un-
derstanding of how they work is trailing behind. While pa-
pers do exist that provide a deeper understanding of how
a classifier arrives at its predictions (Henelius et al. 2014;
Duivesteijn and Thaele 2014; Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin
2016; 2018), such information is typically of a local, anecdo-
tal, or empirical form. Valuable as that information can be,
there is a dearth of fundamental mathematical understanding
of what goes on in deep learning.
The last layer of state-of-the-art neural networks computes
the final classifications by approximation through the softmax
function (Boltzmann 1868). This function partitions the trans-
formed input space into cones, each of which encompasses a
single class. Conceptually, this is equivalent to putting a num-
ber of centroids at equal distance from the origin in this trans-
formed space, and clustering the data points in the dataset
by proximity to these centroids through k-means. Several
recent papers posed that exploring a relation between soft-
max and k-means can be beneficial (Kilinc and Uysal 2018;
Peng, Zhou, and Zhu 2018; Schilling et al. 2018). Kilinc and
Uysal write in (Kilinc and Uysal 2018, Section 3.3):
“One might suggest performing k-means cluster-
ing on the representation observed in the augmented
softmax layer (Z or softmax(Z)) rather than F . Prop-
erties and respective clustering performances of these
representation spaces are empirically demonstrated in
the following sections.”
As this quote demonstrates, the current state of scientific
knowledge on the relation between k-means and softmax is
empirical, which leads into our main contribution:
Main Contribution. We mathematically prove the relation
between the transformation performed by softmax, and k-
means clustering (cf. Theorem 1 and Equation (1)).
We show that predictions of neural networks based on
the softmax activation function are equivalent to assigning
transformed data points to the closest centroid, as known
from k-means. The centroids are here calculated from the
weights of the last layer and the transformation of the data
points is given by the output of the penultimate layer.
1.1 Auxiliary Contributions
One can use this relation to explain why softmax-based neural
networks are sensitive to one-pixel attacks in image classifi-
cation (Su, Vargas, and Sakurai 2019). A picture needs to be
classified into one of several conceptual classes, which neu-
ral networks nowadays often can do with a high confidence.
Softmax performs this task by evaluating, in the transformed
space, in which cone the image falls. Softmax does not care
whether the image is close to the corresponding centroid or
far removed: it is merely closest to the centroid in its cone,
but the distance may be very large or very small. A one-pixel
attack consists of changing a carefully selected pixel in an
input image, in such a way that the neural network assigns
the wrong class with high confidence. Images that are not
vulnerable to one-pixel attacks, are likely to lie very close
to the corresponding centroid in the transformed space; im-
ages that are vulnerable, are likely to lie further away. The
one-pixel attack may force the image across the border of its
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cone, moving them closer to another centroid. The softmax
cone classification is likely to assign too high a confidence to
such images. What we should do instead, is allow the final
layer of a neural network to be less confident in such cases: a
neural network should be allowed to have reasonable doubt,
just as humans do.
Theoretical work on the effect of misclassification due to
small perturbations of the input revolves around the Lipschitz
continuity of the function of the network (Tsuzuku, Sato,
and Sugiyama 2018). Generally, exact computation of the
Lipschitz modulus is NP-hard even for two-layer networks,
and state-of-the-art methods may significantly overestimate
it (Virmaux and Scaman 2018a).
Auxiliary Contribution 1. We theoretically show that in ad-
dition to a small Lipschitz modulus, the robustness of a neural
net also depends on the proximity with which confidently clas-
sified points are mapped to their corresponding centroid (cf.
Theorem 2). This establishes a connection between the ro-
bustness of a network and its mapping to a k-means-friendly
space.
In reverse, the clustering suitability of the penultimate
layer also has an influence on the Lipschitz modulus.
Auxiliary Contribution 2. We propose Centroid Based Tai-
loring as an alternative to the softmax function in the last
layer of a neural network, which:
• is theoretically well-founded through its relation with k-
means clustering;
• has competitive performance on records not vulnerable to
one-pixel attacks;
• is able to express reasonable doubt whenever confronted
with data points vulnerable to one-pixel attacks.
Auxiliary Contribution 3. We propose an easily integrated
proximal minimization update, such that the weights directly
return the centroids, according to which the classification is
performed.
Our experiments show that models which are trained this
way consistently achieve a higher test-accuracy. The view
of network classification as a k-means cluster assignment
enables the definition of a new activation function based on
the Gaussian kernel function. We propose postprocessing
of trained neural networks, where the weights of hidden
layers are trained such that the output of the penultimate
layer is close to the centroids. We empirically show that
this procedure reduces the number of images for which a
successful one-pixel-attack can be found by a factor ranging
from 2.7 up to 6.8.
2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the literature is devoid of any
paper deriving the relation between the softmax output layer
and k-means clustering, which is what the paper you are
currently reading provides. The closest related papers are
(Peng, Zhou, and Zhu 2018; Kilinc and Uysal 2018), which
were discussed in the Introduction; their exploration of the
relation between softmax and k-means does not go beyond
the empirical level.
As softmax activation is practically a linear function, (Gal
2016) shows in a different context that it extrapolates with un-
justified high confidence data points which are very far from
the training data. This makes it very sensitive to noise, which
partially explains why the neural networks using softmax as
a classifier are so easily affected by adversarial attacks.
Closer to our work, (Dou, Osher, and Wang 2018) proves
that in a specific two-layer neural network —a linear layer
followed by a softmax output— the ratio of the classifica-
tion probability can be increased using the fast gradient sign
method and Carlini-Wagners L2 attack. Recently, (Yang et
al. 2018) has formulated language modeling as a matrix fac-
torization problem and identified the fact that the softmax
layer with word embedding does not have enough capacity
to model natural language. Furthermore, (Kanai et al. 2018)
demonstrates that this bottleneck appears due to the fact that
softmax uses an exponential function for non-linearity and
proposes as an alternative a function composed by rectified
linear units and sigmoids.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Further afield, there is a high amount of work on the topic
of adversarial attacks in deep neural networks. Most of these
publications focus on finding different methods to perform
and prevent these attacks. The interested reader is referred to
(Akhtar and Mian 2018) and (Carlini et al. 2019) for a more
detailed survey on these attacks. To the best of our knowl-
edge, paradoxically, not much work exists on the topic of
understanding the fundamental properties of neural networks:
why are they so sensitive and prone to misclassifying with
high confidence input images which are perturbed by a tiny
input noise?
The concept of adversarial attacks stems from a 2009 paper
on Support Vector Machines (Xu, Caramanis, and Mannor
2009); it has been extended to machine learning in general
(Biggio et al. 2013) and deep neural networks in particular
(Szegedy et al. 2014). The latter paper shows that a hardly
perceptible perturbation on a testing input image can create
the same reproducible classification error across two different
models trained on two different subsets of the training data.
In (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), it is shown that
the main problem which creates this error is given by the
enforced linearity introduced in deep neural networks to ease
the optimization problem, although doubt have been cast on
this hypothesis (Tanay and Griffin 2016).
3 The Reason Why Softmax is Sensitive to
Noise: Relation to k-means Clustering
In this section we prove the relation between the transforma-
tion performed by softmax, and k-means clustering. The core
concept of the proof lies in Theorem 1 and the subsequent
Equation (1), in Section 3.2. Before we can get there, how-
ever, we must dedicate a short Section 3.1 to Lipschitz conti-
nuity. After the proof and its fallout, we discuss in Section 4
how to adapt the neural network to reduce its overconfidence.
We begin with discussing feedforward networks, mapping
points in the n-dimensional space to a c-dimensional proba-
bility vector, where c is the number of classes. Let the func-
tion of the network have the following form:
F (x) = σ
(
fp(x)
>W
)
.
Here, fp(x) returns the output of the penultimate layer and σ
is the softmax function. The last layer is linear; its weights
are represented by the matrix W ∈ Rd×c. We assume for
ease of notation that the network function has no bias vector.
Note that any affine function can be stated as a linear function
by increasing the dimension of the input space by one.
3.1 Lipschitz Continuity and Robustness
The effect of misclassification due to small perturbations of
the input is theoretically framed by the Lipschitz continuity
of the function F (Tsuzuku, Sato, and Sugiyama 2018). A
function f : Rn → Rc is Lipschitz continuous with modulus
L, if for every x1, x2 ∈ Rn we have:
‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖ ≤ L ‖x1 − x2‖
Since the Lipschitz modulus of the softmax function is
smaller than one, the Lipschitz modulus of the function F is
given by Lp‖W‖, where Lp is the Lipschitz modulus of the
function fp:
‖F (x1)− F (x2)‖2 ≤
∥∥fp(x1)>W − fp(x2)>W∥∥
≤ Lp ‖W‖ ‖x1 − x2‖ .
If the Lipschitz modulus is small, then points which are close
to each other have also close function values. With respect to
neural networks, this denotes a robustness measure since the
Lipschitz modulus bounds the effect on the classification of
small distortions of data points (Szegedy et al. 2014; Weng
et al. 2018; Virmaux and Scaman 2018b).
3.2 Softmax and Inherent Clustering Properties
We collect in the matrix X ∈ Rn×m the m training data
points, such that point xj = X·j . We notate with fp(X) the
d×m matrix, having the vector fp(xj) as column j.
Theorem 1. Let the dimension of the penultimate layer d
be at least as large as the number of classes: d ≥ c − 1.
Given a network whose predictions are calculated as y =
arg maxk fp(x)
>W·k, there exist c class centroids Z·k ∈ Rd,
equidistant to the origin, such that every point x is assigned
to the class whose center is closest in the transformed space:
y = arg min
k
‖fp(x)− Z·k‖2 .
Proof. Since d ≥ c − 1, a vector v ∈ Rd exists, such that
the vectors W·k + v for k ∈ {1, · · · , c} have the same norm.
The vector v is a solution of the following system of c − 1
linear equations for 2 ≤ l ≤ m:
‖W·1 + v‖2 = ‖W·l + v‖2, which is equivalent to:
2(W·1 −W·l)>v = ‖W·1‖2 − ‖W·l‖2,
Let Z·k = W·k + v. We have:
y = arg max
k
fp(xj)
>W·k
= arg max
k
fp(xj)
>W·k + fp(xj)>v
= arg max
k
fp(xj)
>Z·k
= arg min
k
‖fp(xj)‖2 − 2fp(xj)>Z·k + ‖Z·k‖2
= arg min
k
‖fp(xj)− Z·k‖2.
Theorem 1 implies that the one-hot encoded predictions of
a neural network are computed as
Yˆ = arg min
Y
‖fp(X)> − Y Z>‖2 s.t. Y ∈ 1m×c. (1)
The space 1m×c consists of all binary partition matrices, that
are all binary matrices Y ∈ {0, 1}m×c where every row
contains exactly one one. In clustering this implies that every
point fp(xj) is assigned to exactly one cluster (cluster k if
Yjk = 1). For the neural network this models the notion that
every point is assigned to exactly one class.
Equation (1) is the matrix factorization form of the ob-
jective of k-means cluster assignments. As a result, class
predictions are made according to a Voronoi tesselation of
Rd. Often, the activation function of the penultimate layer is
the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), such that the matrix fp(X)
is nonnegative and the Voronoi tesselation is performed on a
nonnegative space. The result of Theorem 1 and Equation (1)
does yet hold independently of the employed activation func-
tions, as long as the activation function is Lipschitz contin-
uous. Since the class centers Z·k have equal norms, each
Voronoi cell has the shape of a convex cone.
In general, it makes no difference for the classification ac-
curacy how far the points fp(x) are to the centroid, as long as
they are in the correct cone. The softmax confidence is high,
for points which maximize the inner product fp(x)>Z·k,
where Z·k is the class center of the predicted class, as the
following calculation shows:
σ(fp(x)
>W )k =
exp(fp(x)
>W·k)∑c
l=1 exp(fp(x)
>W·l)
· exp(fp(x)
>v)
exp(fp(x)>v)
=
exp(fp(x)
>Z·k)∑c
l=1 exp(fp(x)
>Z·l)
.
As a result, the softmax confidence is high for points fp(x)
which align with the direction of their class center Z·k and
have a large norm. However, the Lipschitz continuity of fp
also yields the following inequality:
‖fp(x)− Z·k‖ ≤ Lp‖x− zk‖, (2)
where zk ∈ Rn such that fp(zk) = Z·k. We call in what
follows the points z which are mapped to a class centroid a
prototype. Equation (2) demonstrates that the distance to the
closest centroid in the penultimate layer is bounded. Points
which lie nearby a prototype are mapped proportionally close
to their class centroid. In addition, with regard to robust-
ness, mapping points far a way from the class center is not
desirable, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. Let x ∈ Rn be a data point with predicted class
k and let the center matrix Z be computed as in the proof
of Theorem 1. We assume that fp is Lipschitz continuous
with modulus Lp. Any distortion ∆ ∈ Rn which changes the
prediction of point x˜ = x+ ∆ to another class l 6= k has a
minimum size of
‖∆‖≥ ‖Z·l − Z·k‖ − ‖fp(x˜)− Z·l‖ − ‖fp(x)− Z·k‖
Lp
.
Proof. Let x,∆ and Z be as described above. We derive
from the triangle inequality and from the Lipschitz continuity
the following inequality:
‖fp(x˜)− Z·k‖ ≤ ‖fp(x˜)− fp(x)‖+ ‖fp(x)− Z·k‖
≤ Lp‖∆‖+ ‖fp(x)− Z·k‖. (3)
The triangle inequality also yields the following relationship:
‖Z·l − Z·k‖ ≤ ‖fp(x˜)− Z·l‖+ ‖fp(x˜)− Z·k‖.
Subtracting ‖fp(x˜)− Z·l‖ yields a lower bound on the dis-
tance ‖fp(x˜) − Z·k‖, which we apply in Equation (3) to
obtain the final bound on the distortion ∆.
Theorem 2 provides three possible explanations for the
phenomenon that too often (very) small distortions are suffi-
cient to change the prediction of the neural network: 1) the
Lipschitz modulus is large, 2) class centroids are close to each
other, or 3) point x or x˜ is not mapped close to their class
centroid. The first case addresses the known measurement of
robustness via the Lipschitz modulus. The second aspect, the
distance between the centroids is maximized with the soft-
max confidence of the predicted class. Since the centroids are
equidistant to the origin, the distance between the centroids is
maximial if the centroids are orthogonal. Similarly, the soft-
max confidence of the predicted class achieves its maximum
value σ(fp(x)>W )k = 1 only if the point fp(x) = αZ·k
points in the same direction as the closest centroid (α > 0)
and if the centroids are orthogonal. Hence, maximizing the
softmax confidence of the predicted class goes hand in hand
with maximizing the distance of the centroids.
Now, if the Lipschitz modulus is reasonably small and the
centroids are far away from each other, then a small distortion
resulting in a change of prediction entails that one of the
points x or x˜ are not close to its centroid. This motivates the
definition of a new confidence measure, reflecting how far a
point in the penultimate layer is from its centroid.
4 Gauss-Confidence and Centroid Based
Optimization
The interpretation of the penultimate layer output as a k-
means clustering space motivates the consideration of a new
confidence function. A natural choice which reflects the prox-
imity to the cluster centroids is the Gaussian kernel function.
Definition 1. Given a function fp : Rn → Rd and a centroid
matrix C ∈ Rd×c, we define the Gauss-confidence as the vec-
tor returned by the function κ(x), where for k ∈ {1, . . . , c}
κ(x)k = exp(−‖fp(x)− C·k‖2) ∈ (0, 1]. (4)
Algorithm 1 Centroid-based feed forward network
1: function TAILORNETWORK(fp, X, Y )
2: C ← fp(X)Y (Y >Y )−1 . Centroid update
3: minfp = ‖fp(X)> − Y C>‖2
4: end function
Defining a confidence measurement based on the Gaussian
kernel function is also known from so-called imposter net-
works (Lebedev, Babenko, and Lempitsky 2018). Imposter
networks learn as many prototypes as there are training ex-
amples. That is instead of c centroids, imposter networks
consider m centroids which determine the class by means
of the average Gauss-confidence of imposters belonging to
one class. In contrast to imposter networks and the softmax-
classification, we do not employ any normalization. Hence,
the proposed Gauss-score does not return a probability vector,
which in return enables the reflection of outliers. That is, we
say a point x is close to a prototype of the predicted class
if it is close to the centroid, resulting in a Gauss-confidence
κ(x)k ≈ 1. An outlier is far away from all cluster centroids,
which is reflected in a Gauss-confidence κ(x)l ≈ 0 for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , c}.
4.1 Gauss-Networks
Based on the results of Theorem 2, we aim for robust net-
works which map well-classifiable points close to the corre-
sponding centroid and points which are difficult to classify
further away from all centroids. To do so, the centroids should
lie in the domain of the function fp. Otherwise, all points in
class k will have a minimum distance of
δk = min
x
‖fp(x)− C·k‖
to their centroid. For example, the equidistant centroids repre-
sented by the matrix Z in Theorem 1 possibly attain negative
values. Thus, if the function fp maps to the nonnegative
space, which is often the case due to employed ReLu acti-
vation functions, penultimate layer outputs might never get
close to their centroid.
If we apply the theory of k-means clustering, then the
optimal centroids are given by the means of all points fp(xj)
belonging to one class. The k-means objective in Equation (1)
minimizes the whithin-cluster scatter and maximizes the intra-
cluster distances. Hence, choosing the centroids according to
the k-means objective
C = fp(X)Y
(
Y >Y
)−1
provides a trade-off between the required proximity of points
to their class centroid and the distance between the class
centroids.
We roughly outline in Algorithm 1 our proposed post-
processing step, returning a network which maximizes the
Gauss-confidences of correct classifications. Given a network,
whose output of the penultimate layer is represented by the
mapping fp, a training set X ∈ Rn×m and the correspond-
ing class labels Y ∈ 1m×c, the function GAUSSNETWORK
refines the network such that the training points are mapped
Table 1: Results on Cifar-10 datasets for the two architectures VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) and ResNet18 (He et
al. 2015), three runs per configuration. For both the traditional network and the Gauss network, we report four columns: test
set accuracy, average confidence in the predicted class, percentage of images misled by a one-pixel attack, and the average
confidence in those misclassification. Confidences reported in the left block are softmax-confidences; those in the right block are
Gauss-confidences.
Traditional network Gauss network
Prediction Attack Prediction Attack
Run Network accuracy conf rate conf accuracy conf rate conf
1 VGG16 92.5% 0.97 52% 0.84 92.7% 0.70 13% 0.59
2 VGG16 93.0% 0.97 44% 0.79 93.1% 0.78 16% 0.70
3 VGG16 92.8% 0.97 52% 0.81 93.0% 0.81 18% 0.68
1 ResNet18 94.4% 0.98 34% 0.77 94.2% 0.74 5% 0.61
2 ResNet18 94.8% 0.98 33% 0.76 94.8% 0.76 7% 0.49
3 ResNet18 95.0% 0.98 34% 0.79 94.8% 0.76 7% 0.63
close to their corresponding centroid. The centroids C are
chosen according to the k-means optimality criterion and a
minimization subject to the network is performed. We do
not outline here an implementation of the optimization step,
as it is easily integrated into the standard optimization of
neural networks by backpropagation. We refer to the net-
works returned by the function GAUSSNETWORK as Gauss
networks.
5 Experimental Results
We evaluate the proposed Gauss networks with respect to two
of their core properties: robustness and a suitable reflection
of classification confidences and prototypes and outliers by
the Gauss-confidence. For this purpose we compare popu-
lar network architectures with the refined Gauss variant on
the Cifar-10 (Krizhevsky 2009) and MNIST (Lecun et al.
1998) datasets. For all experiments we employ a PyTorch
implementation based on the network architectures and op-
timization scheme provided by https://github.com/
kuangliu/pytorch-cifar. We will publish our code
upon acceptance of the paper.
We evaluate the robustness of models by means of two
attack methods: the one pixel attack (Su, Vargas, and Sakurai
2019) and the Fast Gradient Sign Attack (FGSM) (Good-
fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). One of the theoretical
strengths of Gauss networks is the possibility to identify out-
liers. Since the softmax confidence of the predicted class is
always larger than 1c , we also specify that a point is consid-
ered as an outlier if the Gauss confidence of the predicted
class is smaller than 1c . Since we consider only datasets with
ten classes, the outlier threshold is equal to 0.1.
5.1 Cifar-10 Results
We investigate the vulnerability to one pixel attacks on 500
samples of the Cifar-10 test-dataset. One pixel attacks demon-
strate a large discrepancy between the perception of the hu-
man brain and neural networks. There exists a plethora of
example images, in which changing a single pixel leads to
the neural network assigning the wrong class with high con-
fidence. Here, we want to investigate whether this effect
pertains when a notion of outliers according to the robustness
influencing distance to centroids is possible (cf. Theorem 2).
Table 1 lists results for three runs of every network con-
figuration on the Cifar-10 dataset. We experiment with two
network architectures, VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman
2014) and ResNet18 (He et al. 2015). For every run we report
two blocks of numbers; the leftmost block corresponds to
statistics regarding the neural network as it is out-of-the-box,
and the rightmost block corresponds to the same statistics
regarding the corresponding Gauss network. Hence, like-for-
like comparison of numbers in the left and right block is the
main competition in these experiments.
Within a block, we report four columns of statistics. The
first two columns concern the prediction of the network on
the test set: accuracy and average confidence are reported.
The last two columns concern the vulnerability of the net-
work to one-pixel attacks: we report the percentage of images
for which the most harmful one-pixel attack results in mis-
classification, and the average confidence of the network for
these misclassifications. All confidence reported in the last
column per block of Table 1 is misplaced; this number should
be as close to zero as possible.
Notice that due to the network construction, confidences in
the left and right block of the table are not the same: the left
block contains confidence values as reported through softmax,
and in the right block we report average Gauss-confidences.
When comparing the leftmost columns in each block, we
see that the Gauss network essentially maintains the predic-
tive accuracy of the original networks. Sometimes the accu-
racy is a little bit better, sometimes it is a little bit worse, but
overall there seems to be little difference. Comparison of the
second columns shows that confidence of the Gauss network
is markedly lower than that of the traditional network. This is
hardly surprising: we set out to reduce the network’s vulner-
ability to one-pixel attacks by building in reasonable doubt,
so one would expect the Gauss network to doubt itself more
on all cases. Since the reduced confidence does not come
with a drop-off in predictive accuracy, we claim that this is a
desirable result. The third columns of both blocks reveal that
we have accomplished our mission: the percentage of images
vulnerable to one-pixel attacks has dropped dramatically (by
a factor between roughly 2.7 and 6.8). Comparison of the
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
co
nfi
de
nc
e
x˜
VGG16
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
confidence x
co
nfi
de
nc
e
x˜
ResNet
softmax Gauss
Figure 1: Comparison of the confidence of the predicted class
for points x in the test set and the corresponding one pixel
attack x˜ for the two architectures VGG16 and ResNet. The
size of a point is equal to the square root of the number of
points which have the corresponding confidence. Best viewed
in color.
final columns show that the Gauss network has a substantially
lower misplaced confidence in its misclassifications than the
traditional network has, although this might be an artefact of
the overall lower confidence.
This poses the question if there does also exist a low thresh-
old for the softmax confidence, which decreases the attack
rate if we accept only successful attacks with a confidence
higher than the given threshold. We inspect the distribution
of softmax and Gauss confidences of successfully performed
one pixel attacks in Figure 1. We plot the confidence of test
data point x against the confidence of its one pixel alteration
x˜, which results in a change of prediction. The size of each
point corresponds to the square root of the number of oc-
currences of the denoted confidence pair. We observe that
the Gauss-confidences are almost uniformly distributed over
the whole space while the softmax confidence of the one
pixel attacks x˜ concentrates in the interval [0.5, 1]. Hence,
the attack rate of softmax networks would only drop if we
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Figure 2: Accuracy and confidence of the FGSM attack on
the MNIST data for the traditional and Gauss-networks. The
parameter  denotes the step-size. Best viewed in color.
set a threshold higher than 0.5. The low attack rates of the
Gauss confidence are therewith not an artefact of the aver-
agely lower Gauss confidence.
5.2 MNIST results
The monochrome handwritten digits in the MNIST dataset
are not vulnerable to one-pixel attacks in any way resembling
the magnitude of the problem on Cifar-10, so we cannot
simply replicate the experimental results from the previous
section on this dataset. Instead, we illustrate how the pre-
dictive accuracy of the two networks (traditional and Gauss
network) varies when increasing the level of distortions as
provided by the FGSM attack. We plot the resulting accuracy
and confidence of successfully attacked test data points in
Figure 2. The accuracy reflects the percentage of successfully
attacked images in the test dataset.
When the  parameter increases, all networks at some
point display severely deteriorating accuracy. However, the
accuracy of the Gauss network does not decrease as rapidly.
The gap between the accuracies for Gauss and traditional
networks increases with . Similarly, the higher the distortion,
the more confident do the networks become in the confidence
of wrong classifications. Both confidence scores approximate
the average confidences of the networks in the test dataset
(0.98 for traditional networks and 0.56 for Gauss-networks).
We show by means of the MNIST dataset which images
come close to prototypes of their class and which images are
classified as outliers. We display the images which gain high-
est, respectively lowest Gauss-confidence scores in their re-
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Figure 3: Prototypes (top half) and outliers (bottom half)
according to the Gauss confidence measure, with associated
Gauss-confidence values.
spective class on the top and bottom of Figure 3. The number
on top of each image is the corresponding Gauss confidence.
We see that the assessment of prototypes and outliers by the
Gauss network largely corresponds to a human perception of
well and difficult to interpret ciphers. Thus, the information
given by the Gauss confidence actually corresponds with the
notion of prototypes and outliers. For comparison, traditional
networks generally classify a noise image with confidence
higher that 0.9 to one of the classes while a Gauss network
reflects the outlier with confidences close to zero.
6 Conclusions
We mathematically prove that the predictions of neural net-
works based on the softmax activation function are equivalent
to k-means clustering. This connection was intuited in exist-
ing work, but it has never before been formally derived. The
output of the penultimate layer of the network represents a
transformed data space. That space is partitioned into cones
by the softmax function; each cone encompasses a single
class. Conceptually, this is equivalent to putting a number of
centroids, to be calculated from the weights of the last layer,
at equal distance from the origin in the transformed space;
the data points in the dataset are subsequently classified, by
clustering them through k-means by proximity to the cen-
troids. We formally derive this connection in Theorem 1 and
subsequent Equation (1).
The k-means/softmax relation can be used to explain why
softmax-based neural networks are sensitive to adversarial
attacks such as one-pixel attacks. The effect of misclassifica-
tion due to small input perturbations had been theoretically
analyzed in terms of the Lipschitz continuity of the network
function (Tsuzuku, Sato, and Sugiyama 2018); exact com-
putation of the relevant Lipschitz modulus had been shown
to be NP-hard (Virmaux and Scaman 2018a). We theoret-
ically show that in addition to a small Lipschitz modulus,
the robustness of a neural net also depends on the proximity
with which confidently classified points are mapped to their
corresponding centroid (cf. Theorem 2). Hence, we establish
a connection between the robustness of a network and their
mapping to a k-means-friendly space.
In Section 4, we introduce an alternative to the softmax
function in the last layer of a neural network. This centroid-
based tailored version of the network is theoretically well-
founded, since we have explored the relation with k-means
clustering. Moreover, the tailoring does not affect the predic-
tive accuracy of the network on the Cifar-10 test set, while
substantially reducing the proportion of images whose worst
one-pixel attack leads to misclassification: this rate drops by
a factor between roughly 2.7 and 6.8 (cf. Table 1). On the
MNIST dataset, we have seen how the tailored version of
the network achieves highest accuracy when confronted with
reasonable levels of noise in handwritten digits (cf. Figure
2). Our new tailored neural network reduces vulnerability to
small-noise attacks due to its capability of expressing rea-
sonable doubt; the lack of doubt in traditional networks is
illustrated in Figure 1, where we also see that the Gauss net-
work spreads its confidence levels throughout the available
space. This effect is desirable, since the non-boosted Gauss-
confidence allows the network to distinguish class prototypes,
such as the clearly written digits in the top half of Figure 3,
from outliers, such as the abstract worm paintings in the
bottom half of Figure 3.
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